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BOOK REVIEW: CASTING OFF THE CANON: 
FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, 
JILL ELAINE HASDAY (Harvard University Press, 2014) 
Laurie S. Kohn* 
INTRODUCTION 
The contours of marriage and family have shifted dramatically in 
the past several decades. Recent family law scholarship has analyzed 
how the law will accommodate the changing forms of marriage, 
parenthood, and family.1 To consider how the family law canon will 
react to such societal changes affecting marriage and the family, one 
must have a distinct vision of the canon in the first place. Jill Hasday’s2 
new book, entitled Family Law Reimagined, offers a clear-eyed vision of 
what family law is, what it is not, and where it might be headed. Hasday 
considers family law’s canon—the set of principles by which we have 
come to characterize family law—and then debunks the canon by 
methodically setting forth each notion and illustrating its inaccuracies or 
limitations. In doing so, Hasday urges the reader to clear the noise of the 
canon and to see the law in all its messy inconsistencies and 
shortcomings. 
The central mission of this book—debunking the traditional family 
law narrative—is an enormously valuable one. As Hasday explains, 
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reliance on the canon keeps us from clearly understanding the realities 
and shortcomings of the law as it stands. Adherence to the canons 
encourages lazy, superficial, and anti-progressive thinking—as she 
explains, it “misdirects attention away from the actual problems that 
family law confronts, and misshapes the policies that courts, legislatures, 
and advocates pursue.”3 She illustrates that the exceptions often swallow 
what are believed to be the family law accepted norms. Until we can 
sharply see and understand family law, we cannot effectively respond to 
the changes in today’s society, according to Hasday. Considering family 
law from a more authentic and nuanced place will allow us to implement 
more effective law and policy. 
Hasday’s exhortation to debunk conventional wisdom is an 
irresistible invitation and a perfect place to start the book. She beautifully 
illustrates the allure of debunking the traditional notions of family law. 
Hasday does so by first surfacing the pervasiveness of legislatures’ and 
courts’ rhetorical adherence to this canon and then by elucidating the 
ubiquity of the exceptions to the canon.4 Who does not want to debunk 
conventional wisdom? Hasday does it so deftly that I found myself 
considering what else I could debunk. In fact, the fun she has seems to 
have debunking the canon inspired me to consider suggesting she draft 
subsequent volumes on other areas of the law. Contract Law 
Reimagined; Property Law Rethought; International Law Revisited; 
Constitutional Law Recast and so on. The intellectual allure of 
marshaling a coherent vision of a traditional canon and then debunking it 
comes through clearly and intriguingly in this book. 
Accordingly, this Book Review celebrates Hasday’s deft 
deconstruction of the canon, and then builds on her notions of recasting 
the canon. This Review notes both where the book guides us in effective 
directions and where it suggests responses that might be excessively 
destabilizing and in need of further consideration as we move forward in 
the endeavor of adapting family law to the changed and changing 
realities of marriage and family. Hasday’s book is divided roughly into 
thirds, with the first two thirds setting forth and then debunking the 
canon. The last third addresses what is missing from the family law 
canon, and then concludes with proposals about how to recast it. This 
Review proceeds in two parts. Part I offers an overview of Hasday’s 
book. Part II considers Hasday’s prescriptions and offers additional 
notions of how to adapt family law to the realities of today’s families as 
we move forward. 
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I. THE CANON AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
First, Hasday presents and debunks what she identifies as a central 
principle of the family law canon—family law exceptionalism. It is 
conventional wisdom that family law is exceptional—different from 
other legal doctrines—in that it is locally derived, implemented, and 
enforced. She notes that this localism is sacrosanct and an enduring 
refrain in case law.5 Indeed, it is considered self-evident that family law 
is the province of the states and not the federal government.6 
After convincingly illustrating the rhetorical adherence to this 
principle, Hasday tears it down—using methodology she uses throughout 
the first two thirds of the book—demonstrating by example after 
example that the exceptions to this principle are so ubiquitous as to 
negate the principle. For example, she lists and describes scores of 
federal decisions and statutes regulating families including a long line of 
Supreme Court cases delineating the right to marry and the parameters of 
divorce;7 the division of property in the creation of federal common law 
that preempts state law;8 and evidentiary privileges related to marriage.9 
Hasday also sets forth pages of federal statutes that regulate issues 
integrally related to the family including immigration,10 citizenship11 and 
tax and employment. 12  Hasday compellingly demonstrates the way 
diffuse federal law intimately affects the family.13 She also illustrates that 
by delinking our commitment to the narrative of family law as local, we 
can consider if federal family law occasionally would be preferable.14 In 
addition, she determines that, at times, it is. 
Hasday also seeks to debunk the myth of family law exceptionalism 
that is situated in the perception of family law as separate from the 
market. She argues that the canonical narrative of family law as insulated 
from economic exchange principles is descriptively inaccurate, and that 
it instigates a misdirected debate amongst scholars and judges about 
whether courts should consider enforcing economic exchanges between 
family members. 15  According to Hasday, the argument is off-base 
                                                                                                             
 5 Id. at 17. 
 6 See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (describing “regulation 
of domestic relation [as] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually 
exclusive province of the States.”). 
 7 Hasday, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
 8 Hasday, supra note 3, at 44. 
 9 Hasday, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
 10 Hasday, supra note 3, at 46-49. 
 11 Hasday, supra note 3, at 49-50. 
 12 Hasday, supra note 3, at 53-57. 
 13 Hasday, supra note 3, at 39-59. 
 14 Hasday, supra note 3, at 60-61. 
 15 Hasday, supra note 3, at 67. 
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because the often-invoked legal principle of family law as separate from 
the market is a principle with more exceptions than examples of 
application. 16  Hasday highlights the surviving examples of the law’s 
commitment to keeping the market and the family separate by reference 
to examples of the prohibition on inter-spousal contracts for domestic 
services and its refusal to consider human capital as property to be 
divided at divorce. She then deftly surfaces contradictions of this 
principle—the myriad examples of the legal system’s enforcement of 
economic exchanges within the family. 17  Enforcement of pre and 
postnuptial agreements of contracts for services between adult family 
members, and the imposition of child support and spousal support 
obligations all comprise Hasday’s convincing illustrations of the reality 
of law’s widespread approval of economic exchange within the family 
structure.18 Hasday argues that the myth of family law as separate from 
the market obscures the critical normative issue of how the legal system 
should regulate economic exchange within the family. 19  As such, it 
allows the state to do so without extensive commentary, in a way that 
systematically disadvantages women and the poor.20 
In her methodical analysis of the family law canon, Hasday next 
turns to a skeptical eye toward the canon’s progress narratives—
supposed themes that portray family law as evolving toward justice and 
equality. She looks first at narratives relating to adults, and then to 
children. As with the prior narratives, Hasday begins by documenting the 
existence and salience of the canon’s family law progress narrative, 
which touts the development of family law as one of rapid, dramatic 
changes, and of abdication of policies that perpetuate subordination. 
While she admits that the story of family law’s evolution has been one 
with a fair amount of progress, she argues that the progress narrative 
overstates the case and obscures a reality that is less dramatic than the 
narrative suggests. 21  Further, she asserts it is one that continues to 
perpetuate certain injustices.22 A narrative of progress, she asserts, can 
allow courts, advocates, and policy makers alike to rest on their laurels 
and to cease to seek further reform.23 
Hasday then provides rich examples that contradict the progress 
myth, focusing first on coverture. She sets forth a fulsome discussion of 
                                                                                                             
 16 Hasday, supra note 3, at 68-86. 
 17 Hasday, supra note 3, at 75-86. 
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 21 Hasday, supra note 3, at 97-98. 
 22 Hasday, supra note 3, at 98. 
 23 Hasday, supra note 3, at 132. 
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the supposed demise of the coverture doctrine and a fascinating analysis 
of how reliance on its demise has justified the implementation of laws, 
policies, and judicial decisions that subordinate and disadvantage 
women. Further, she argues that coverture—through formally eradicated 
from the law—continues to shape the contours of family law.24 
This part of the book closes as Hasday debunks the progress 
narrative that parental prerogatives no longer trump children’s interests. 
Although acknowledging the partial truth of this narrative, Hasday 
asserts that parental prerogatives, in fact, remain paramount when there 
is a conflict between a parent’s interest and a child’s interest. 
While Hasday’s point is well taken—that progress narratives can 
serve to distract us from the further work that the law needs to do to 
become truly progressive—this section overreaches in a way that the 
earlier sections did not. Though one cannot claim we have succeeded in 
eradicating all forms of subordination and injustice in family law, there 
has been progress since the mid-19th century, where Hasday herself 
begins her analysis. Whereas the prior sections forcefully develop the 
existence of inaccurate narratives, the progress narratives in this section 
seem more like red herrings. Hasday does not so much debunk them as 
note that they are an overstatement. 
In the final third of the book, Hasday turns from what the family 
law canon misdescribes to what it altogether misses. She argues that the 
exclusive focus on family law narratives renders all the stakeholders—
policy makers, judges, advocates, and commentators alike—blind to 
populations and situations that do not comport with the canon. By way of 
example, Hasday devotes a chapter to the law’s failure to adequately 
address family ties that are exclusive of marriage or parenthood and their 
functional equivalents. Particularly, Hasday argues that the law largely 
ignores sibling and grandparent relationships. She argues that the law has 
not imposed obligations such as child support on those parties, nor has it 
developed in a way that recognizes the potential those relationships had 
to provide stability. 25  Somewhat surprisingly overlooking the recent 
development of grandparent visitation doctrine and statutes, 26  and of 
third party custody statutes that are largely used by grandparents and 
                                                                                                             
 24 Hasday, supra note 3, at 107-08. 
 25 Hasday, supra note 3, at 163-64. 
 26 See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 9-13-103 (2009) (creating a cause of action for a 
grandparent seeking visitation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117(1) (2014) (same); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3301 (2012) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A, § 
1803(1) (2008) (same); MISS. CODE ANN § 93-16-3(1) (2009) (same). 
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often by older siblings,27 Hasday may overstate the law’s blindness to 
these relationships. 
Hasday also focuses on sibling relationships as an example of the 
law’s failure to adequately acknowledge nonmarital and nonparental 
relationships. She notes that with a few exceptions, the law ignores 
sibling relationships when they are most vulnerable and in need of 
protection.28 For example, she notes that children have no standing in 
adoption proceedings affecting themselves or their siblings.29 No matter 
how strong their family ties, a sibling’s preference to retain a formal or 
informal relationship with his or her sibling is legally irrelevant.30 While 
adoption law may express a preference for keeping siblings together, and 
while some states mention visitation or communication between siblings 
separated by adoption, Hasday laments that most of these protections are 
discretionary, at the whim of the court or of the adoptive parents.31 She 
chronicles only a few states that confer on siblings the right to seek post 
adoption contact with each other.32 Similarly, she notes, siblings enjoy 
very few protections in divorce and custody proceedings, their interests 
deferring to parental preferences.33 Hasday ends the chapter with several 
prescriptive pages setting forth how the law could address and 
acknowledge the importance of sibling relationships. Generally, she 
urges that family law should shed its narrow frame and think more 
broadly about family relationships and rights.34 
Hasday then shines a light on the omission from the canon of 
family law for the poor. She asserts that policy makers and judges fail to 
consider the poor in decision and policy making and leave the story of 
the poor family entirely out of the canon. 35  “Canonical accounts of 
family law that focus narrowly on the legal regulation of families 
considered financially self-reliant and omit reference to welfare law have 
helped legislators and judges to avoid discussing, much less defending, 
                                                                                                             
 27 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT § 25-409(A)(1) (2013) (granting standing for a 
nonparent who stands in loco parentis to a child to petition for custody); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(b) (2012) (creating a cause of action for nonparents 
to petition for custody); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(B)(2) (2013) (allowing a 
nonparent or grandparent under certain circumstances to seek custody of a 
minor); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.432 (2009) (allowing a grandparent to seek 
custody of a minor). 
 28 See Hasday, supra note 3, at 167-68. 
 29 Hasday, supra note 3, at 168-76. 
 30 Hasday, supra note 3, at 168-76. 
 31 Hasday, supra note 3, at 172-73. 
 32 Hasday, supra note 3, at 173-74. 
 33 Hasday, supra note 3, at 176-83. 
 34 Hasday, supra note 3, at 183-94. 
 35 Hasday, supra note 3, at 195-96. 
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this divide between family law for the poor and family law for everyone 
else.”36 
Here Hasday draws a connection between the narrative of the 
family privacy and the omission of the poor from the family law canon 
by explaining the Supreme Court’s dogged commitment to distinguishing 
welfare law from family law.37 In fact, Hasday argues that welfare law, 
in the myriad ways it affects the interactions, obligations, and structure 
of poor families is itself family law.38 While noting that poor families are 
much more highly regulated than other families, Hasday does not 
critique this regulation, but asserts that the Supreme Court is being 
disingenuous in its doctrinal distinction between family and welfare law 
jurisprudence. She argues that the Court uses that distinction to justify its 
reliance on principles of privacy and autonomy in considering family law 
(for the well-off family) and intervention and redistribution in 
considering welfare law (for the poor family). In this section, Hasday 
does not offer any prescriptive responses, but rather firmly argues that 
this unacknowledged differential treatment of the family requires 
“explanation and justification, or elimination.”39 
After Hasday’s convincing surfacing and subsequent debunking 
and critique of the canon, the reader finds herself thirsting for Hasday to 
offer her ideas for recasting the family law canon, as promised in the title 
of the conclusion.  On the front, Hasday leaves the reader somewhat 
unsated. This concluding chapter – which is only five pages when the 
reader would far prefer to learn much from Hasday – summarizes the 
shortcomings of the canon and reasserts the need for recasting it. She 
implores lawmakers, judges, scholars, and academics to engage in this 
process of recasting family, acknowledging that is a significant and 
challenging project. 
II. WHAT FOLLOWS THE CANON? 
Hasday’s book makes a compelling case for the desperate need for 
the reimagination of family law. In this part, this Book Review first 
considers the proposals Hasday herself puts forth to address the canon’s 
shortcomings and then it considers alternate ways to address the 
problems that Family Law Reimagined surfaces. 
                                                                                                             
 36 Hasday, supra note 3, at 196-97. 
 37 Hasday, supra note 3, at 197-208. 
 38 Hasday, supra note 3, at 220. 
 39 Hasday, supra note 3, at 220. 
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The Limitations of Hasday’s Reconstructive Proposals 
Hasday’s critique and debunking of the family law canon is salient 
and effective. Her prescriptions—which are a far less significant aspect 
of this book’s mission —raise questions and concerns to be resolved. 
While her critique of the canon frequently assails the status quo from the 
perspective of women and the disenfranchised, her own proposals may 
pose some risk for those very groups. The proposals sometimes advocate 
for expanding the role of the law in families, by inviting additional 
government intrusion into families, which can be problematic—
especially poor families. 
In several sections of Family Law Reimagined, Hasday makes 
concrete proposals to either fill gaps ignored by the canon or to address 
the deceptiveness of the canon. For example, Hasday asserts the law’s 
supposed commitment to the separation of market and family masks the 
reality that it does regulate exchange within the family. She suggests that 
in considering how it should do so, courts should allow broader inter-
spousal litigation for the enforcement of domestic service contracts.40 In 
her discussion of the persistence of coverture principles in our law, 
Hasday critiques the law’s inhospitality to inter-spousal tort suits brought 
for domestic violence, asserting this type of litigation “remains 
infrequent and marginalized by the law.”41 As such, she suggests that the 
law should entertain more federal and state level tort suits for domestic 
violence.42 In debunking the progress myth that touts our evolution away 
from the parental prerogative and toward deference for children’s 
interests, Hasday advocates a more exacting application of the best 
interest standard in custody cases, including ways to “modify or adjust 
the tremendous control that parents exercise over their children’s 
custody, education, employment, punishment and safety that would 
allow the legal system to better uncover, comprehend, respect, and 
protect children’s individual needs. . . .”43 Finally, Hasday proposes the 
introduction of new causes of action for siblings seeking visitation rights 
with their former or current siblings against their parent’s objections.44 
Each of these proposals involves expanding the role of the courts in 
the lives of families. Some of the proposals expand the scope of suits that 
can be brought before the court; others expand the depth of the analysis 
required by the court; and still others enlarge the amount of time parties 
would need to be involved in the action prior to resolution. First, new 
                                                                                                             
 40 Hasday, supra note 3, at 86-88. 
 41 Hasday, supra note 3, at 115. 
 42 Hasday, supra note 3, at 115. 
 43 Hasday, supra note 3, at 158. 
 44 Hasday, supra note 3, at 188. 
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causes of action for inter-spousal enforcement of contracts and for 
sibling visitation would give the legal system more influence over the 
operation of the family,45 expanding the matters into which the court can 
intervene and impose its prerogative.46 
Second, her proposals would invite a far greater judicial skepticism 
about parental decision-making than currently required by the law. 
Specifically, a cause of action for siblings to seek visitation with each 
other after divorce or adoption would force the legal system to greatly 
expand its role in second-guessing parenting decisions. Presently, courts 
consider parenting decisions in the context of abuse and neglect cases 
and custody suits.47 But aside from those contexts, the legal system does 
not permit suits that challenge parenting decisions within the family and 
does not grant children standing to seek to overcome parental 
prerogatives.48 
Moreover, Hasday’s suggestion that courts more closely scrutinize 
parental behavior and prerogatives in the context of family law cases 
would invite an increased level of court intervention into the family.49 
Hasday critiques the best interest standard as one that disingenuously 
                                                                                                             
 45 Further, the creation of new remedies for siblings who seek contact with 
siblings after divorce or adoption seeks to institutionalize the recognition of 
family relationships outside the marital or parental context. While Hasday 
makes a strong argument to justify the value of this move, sibling relationships 
could be given greater recognition without the creation of a new cause of action. 
Consideration of sibling preferences for contact could be an element of adoption 
of custody statute for analysis by the court and statutes could encourage judges 
to implement visitation orders to support those relationships. 
 46 See Hasday, supra note 3, at 183-94 (Hasday’s discussion of such causes 
of action). 
 47 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. 43, § 107.3(D) (2014) (directing the court to 
consider false accusations of child abuse by one parent in determining custody 
as between parents); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5328 (2014) (directing the court 
to consider parenting decisions and past practices); TENN. CODE. ANN.§ 36-6-
106 (2013) (directing the court to consider past parenting in determining future 
custodial arrangements). See also Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family 
or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the 
Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1067 
(1996) (“Cases involving claims of parental unfitness are most likely to arise in 
juvenile court as abuse and neglect proceedings.”). 
 48 See generally Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry for Help: An Argument for 
Abrogation of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and 
Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 617 (1993) (providing an overview of the 
history of the tort immunity doctrine providing that children cannot sue their 
parents for activities inherently a part of the child-parent relationship); Carol 
Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in 
Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 258-59 (1992) (discussing that 
emancipation statutes permit children the right they are otherwise not afforded, 
to sue their parents). 
 49 Hasday, supra note 3, at 155-58. 
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purports to prioritize children’s interests over parental discretion.50 In 
arguing the legal system should be attentive to reifying the progress 
narrative of the law’s attentiveness to children’s interests, Hasday asserts 
that the law must confront the question of when it’s appropriate to 
overcome parental prerogatives and to question the “tremendous 
control”51 that parents exert over children. Without commenting on the 
substantive merit of Hasday’s prescription, it is impossible to ignore that 
the approach recommended requires a much greater level of court-
involvement and a significantly broader scope of evidentiary inquiry. If a 
judge engages in the type of inquiry Hasday advocates, the court would 
demand far more information and the case would be much more complex 
than the ordinary best interest of the child inquiry.52 
Finally, Hasday’s recommendations for expanded use of tort 
actions for domestic violence and for a more exacting and involved 
application of the best interests standard also envision a court system that 
would require more time-consuming intervention into family matters. In 
critiquing the paucity of state level assault and/or battery suits for 
domestic violence, Hasday cites a study—one from the early 1990’s53—
that found that out of “2600 reported state cases for battery, assault, or 
both . . . only fifty-three involved adult parties in a domestic 
relationship.”54 In using tort cases for assault and battery to measure the 
law’s willingness to provide relief for domestic violence, Hasday does 
not fully capture reality.55 Since the 1970’s, the most prevalent, efficient, 
                                                                                                             
 50 Hasday, supra note 3, at 157-58. 
 51 Hasday, supra note 3, at 157-58. 
 52 Further, it’s far from clear that courts are in a position to effectively 
undertake this more exacting role as fact finders. Family courts are notoriously 
overburdened and understaffed. The adversarial system, with its procedural and 
substantive rules, may not be an effective method for surfacing “truth.” And it’s 
not well-situated to implement resolutions that are highly contextual. See 
generally Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making 
about Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY 
J. OF WOMEN & L. 145, 162 (2003) (discussing the criticisms of the adversarial 
model in problem-solving in emotionally fraught cases). 
 53 I’ll pause here for a moment to offer one critique of Hasday’s research. 
While her arguments are exhaustively researched and extraordinarily well 
supported by case law, at times her social science assertions are supported by 
somewhat dated research. For example, as noted above, she cites study about 
assault and battery suits that focuses on cases brought from 1981-1990. Hasday, 
supra note 3, at 115 (citing Donald D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of 
Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 565 (1992)). Further, she suggests a 
recent trend of scholarship supports the 1980’s work of Lenore Weitzman on 
divorce. Hasday, supra note 3, at 116-17. However, the sources she cites were 
published in 1990, 1991, 1993, and 2000. Hasday supra note 3, at 117, n.145. 
 54 Hasday, supra note 3, at 115. 
 55 Hasday, supra note 3, at 115. 
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and accessible form of recourse for domestic violence has been the civil 
protection order (“CPO”). 56  Statistics about the numbers of civil 
protection orders being sought and granted nationwide tell a very 
different story about the legal system’s willingness to intervene in 
intimate relationships with meaningful relief. 57  At the same time, if 
Hasday truly does mean to suggest that the legal system should entertain 
more tort suits for assault and battery between intimate partners, then her 
suggestion invites far more judicial intervention than is generally the 
norm in the current civil legal response to domestic violence. 
Civil protection orders cases are expedited proceedings that do not 
involve procedural hurdles that are typical of civil cases such as filing 
fees, excessively detailed pleading requirements, answers, and 
discovery.58 Protection order cases, pursuant to most state statutes, move 
through the court system anywhere from one to three weeks.59 Pursuant 
to the Violence Against Women Act, courts are not permitted to charge 
filing fees in protection order cases.60 By contrast, the typical civil case 
involves all civil pretrial procedures, filing fees, and is far from quick to 
resolve.61 Further, if Hasday seeks to limit the legal system’s differential 
                                                                                                             
 56 See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic 
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503-04 (2008) (discussing the prevalence and history 
of protection order statutes); Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders for 
Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Questions of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL 
INTERDISC. L.J., 361, 362-63 (2002) (providing an overview of the CPO 
remedy); Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic 
Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND, L. REV. 1015, 1018-19 (2014) (providing 
an overview of the CPO remedy). 
 57 See CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: A GUIDE FOR IMPROVED PRACTICE 3, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES (2010) (citing that 
1.2 million victims each year receive protection orders in the U.S.); Jane K. 
Stoever, Freedom From Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize 
the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 318 (2011) 
(explaining that civil protection orders are now the single most frequently used 
legal remedy to address intimate partner violence). 
 58 See Ko, supra note 56, at 363 (“Civil restraining orders…work to provide 
immediate relief.”). 
 59 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(b)(2) (2009) (temporary protection order 
is issued for 14 days after which time the hearing on the long-term order is 
held); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A, § 4006(1),(2),(3) (2013) (temporary 
protection order is issued for 21 days after which time the hearing on the long-
term order is held); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-925(2) (2012) (temporary protection 
order is issued for 14 days after which time the hearing on the long-term order is 
held); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (2012) (temporary protection order is 
issued for 10 days after which time the hearing on the long-term order is held). 
 60 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796gg-5 (2014) (conditioning the receipt of state funds on 
a jurisdiction refraining from imposing filing fees in protection order cases). 
 61 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to 
Affordable Justice, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 471 (2010) (“It should be a matter 
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impact on women and the disenfranchised, advocating the expansion of a 
legal tool that imposes filing fees and is so involved that it promotes 
parties with lawyers over pro se representation that it directly counteracts 
her goal. 
As discussed, some of Hasday’s concrete prescriptions in this book 
expand the role of the courts in the lives of families. In the past few 
decades, scholarship has chronicled the over-involvement of the courts in 
the lives of families, especially in the lives of poor families. 62  The 
adversarial system for resolving family disputes is time-consuming, often 
expensive, and intrusive.63 Already the standard actions such as abuse 
and neglect, custody, child support, and domestic violence demand high 
levels of personal disclosure.64 Generally, courts are also assailed for 
                                                                                                             
of equal concern to deliver the due process these litigants deserve by refusing to 
consign them to an endless wait for a trial which can never come because their 
opponent insists on a complete, costly, time consuming trial…”); Frank G. 
Evans, The ADR Management Agreement: New Conflict Resolution Roles for 
Texas Lawyers and Mediators, HOUS. LAW. 10, 11 (2007) (explaining that civil 
trial preparation has become more complicated and has escalated the amount 
time cases linger in the court system); Daniel B. Winslow, Alexandra Bedell-
Healy, Economical Litigation Agreements: The “Civil Litigation Prenup” Need, 
Basis, and Enforceability, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 125 (2010) (discussing 
how time consuming discovery procedures can be). 
 62 See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 715, n.154 (2013) (“Poor example, poor families and their 
members are overrepresented in the child welfare, juvenile justice, and prison 
systems.”); Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best 
Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 79 (1995) (“[I]ntervention and intrusion in low-income 
families (is accepted), and we have discounted the cultural backgrounds and 
solid parenting skills of low-income parents.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 63 See Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High 
Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 504 (2001) (“Legal 
scholars and critics of the adversary system contend that the divorce process is 
time-consuming and expensive.”); Steve Swartz, Family Business Litigation: 
The Remedy Can Be Worse Than the Malady, BENCH & B. MINN. 40, April 2004 
(“While in most such cases the dispute has been “resolved” in a legal sense, the 
process ultimately has been inordinately costly.”); Janet Weinstein, And Never 
the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 133 (1997) (discussing that an adversarial procedure 
depletes and expends the resources of the parties involved). 
 64 See Robert H. Aronson, What about the Children? Are Family Lawyers 
the Same (Ethically) As Criminal Lawyers? A Morality Play, 1 J. INST. FOR 
STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 141, 151 (1996) (noting the wide scope of disclosures 
required in child abuse cases); Julian Grant, Victims, Offenders, and Other 
Children: A Right to Privacy?, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 485, 487-89 (1992) 
(discussing the dangers of public disclosure in child abuse cases). 
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their inability to make nuanced decisions about particular families and to 
generate even more conflict than necessary.65 
Even outside the court, poor families are particularly subject to 
government-involvement. The receipt of public benefits is usually 
conditioned on the disclosure of personal information and of continuing 
oversight.66 Indigent families are also disproportionately subject to the 
post-conviction oversight by the criminal justice system. 67  The 
conditions of parole and probation permit the government to impose 
requirements, require disclosures, and exert control over family life.68 
Similarly, the abuse and neglect system, also more often a part of the 
lives of families living below the poverty line, permits and requires 
significant levels of court-involvement and government oversight. 69 
Hasday’s suggestions that would increase or pave the way for new court-
involvement in matters previously left to autonomous family decision-
making must be considered with a critical eye. 
                                                                                                             
 65 See Katharine Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody 
Decisionmaking, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 29, 46 (2014) (referring to the use 
of excessive judicial discretion custody cases as “intuition-based”); Daniel L. 
Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 911 (2013) (“High caseloads 
lead to an increased likelihood that noncustodial parents will be viewed as “all 
the same,” as making excuses, and not credible.”); Laura Sack, Women and 
Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child 
Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 298 (1992) (discussing the 
shortcomings of judicial discretion). Ver Steegh, supra note 52, at 163 (citing a 
study in which 71% of parents reported that the court process escalated the level 
of conflict). 
 66 See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy 
Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1397-98 (2012) (discussing the process by which 
an applicant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) must 
undergo involving extensive disclosures). 
 67 See generally J.M. Zitter, Validity of Requirement That, as Condition of 
Probation, Defendant Submit to Warrantless Searches, 99 A.L.R.5th 557 
(providing an overview of the low expectation of privacy by probationers and 
parolees). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 773 (2001) (noting the prevalence of poor families 
in the child welfare system); Naomi Cahn, Symposium: The Implications of 
Welfare Reform for Children: Welfare Reform and the Juvenile Courts: 
Children’s Interests in the Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and 
Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1199 (1999) (citing the correlation between the 
abuse and neglect system and poor families); Michael Wald, State Intervention 
on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 985, 1021 (1975) (stating the majority of neglect cases involve poor 
families). 
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Post-Canon Family Law 
In the end, Hasday’s debunking initiative is extremely convincing. 
However, if our current canon is inaccurate, distracting, and incomplete, 
then what? After reading Hasday’s first two thirds, I wanted to explore a 
constructive response—a theoretical and practical one; one that would 
allow us to reconstruct a more accurate, coherent, and workable 
narrative; one that would implement a system that responds to the 
realities of the changing families, diverse families, and their needs. Yet, 
Hasday’s practical responses, by her own acknowledgement, just begin 
to address the ways our family law system could more fully respond to 
the shortcomings and omissions in the family law canon. This section 
turns to concrete ways that the family law legal system could evolve to 
address the shortcomings and omissions of the family law canon that are 
so elegantly revealed in Family Law Reimagined. 
1. Improving the Current System by Allowing for the Consideration 
of Context. 
At the root, the vast majority of Hasday’s critiques of the family 
law canon come down to the legal system’s reliance on narratives and 
principles that distract judges from the reality of each case. For example, 
reliance on the narrative that family law is separate from the market 
permits a judge to blindly find contracts for domestic work 
unenforceable without considering the propriety of enforcing the contract 
or the effects of failing to enforce it in the context presented by the 
case.70 A commitment to the inaccurate principle that our family law 
rests at the core on the best interest of the child leads fact finders to fail 
to truly scrutinize the many instances in which the law privileges 
parental prerogatives and to determine, based on the children and parents 
at issue in a particular case, when a better balancing of the two would be 
advisable.71  The law’s failure to recognize the power of the parental 
prerogative can also render judges to blind to the context of the family 
and the interests of siblings in adoption and custody proceedings. Finally, 
Hasday’s critique that the canon neglects to contemplate those living in 
poverty can also be seen as a failure of the law to consider the social and 
economic context of the family when applying and considering the 
impact of the law.72 
Reforming the family law system to allow for more consideration 
of context involves judicial education and for legal and procedural 
                                                                                                             
 70 Hasday, supra note 3, at 94. 
 71 Hasday, supra note 3, at 155-58. 
 72 Hasday, supra note 3, at 195-96. 
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initiatives. First, in order to move toward an adjudicatory system in 
which judges consider the broader context of the family and the legal 
matter before them, judges would first need to understand the importance 
and the relevance of context. Hasday’s debunking and insightful analysis 
of the family law canon would be a powerful way to illustrate this point. 
Hasday’s conclusion exhorts scholars to reconsider their reliance on the 
canon and academics to teach students family law in a way that 
challenges the family law canon and lays bare the reality. The effects of 
these efforts may reach judges through academic journals and through 
lawyering by future lawyers in years to come. But more immediately, 
judicial education about the fallacy of the canon and the way it distracts 
from the realities of the law may well influence the application of the law 
and liberate judges to consider the context of cases more carefully. In 
seeking to increase the relevance of context in the adjudication of cases, 
direct judicial education could prove effective and more efficient than 
efforts aimed at scholarship or legal education. 
A second approach to increasing the mandate for and likelihood 
that judges will more fulsomely consider context would be to reduce the 
reliance on presumptions in family law. Family law relies on a 
significant number of presumptions73 that allow judges to short-circuit 
their consideration of the facts in favor of a predictable outcome.74 Some 
presumptions have been created to safeguard against judge rulings based 
on stereotypes or historically failing to consider relevant evidence. For 
this reason, and because they maximize efficiency, reliance on 
presumptions should not be abolished, but quite possibly reduced.75 In 
current family law doctrine, courts regularly employ the parental 
presumption in favor of granting custody to a biological parent over the 
request of a third party, 76  the presumption of certain proportions of 
                                                                                                             
 73 See Katherine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and 
Common Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law 
Institute’s Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 11, 16 (2002) (noting the 
“number” of presumptions that exist in family law and discussing some at 
length). 
 74 See id. at 12 (discussing the rationale behind presumptions and 
preferences). 
 75 Id. at 23. The presumption against awarding joint custody when one parent 
has committed parental kidnapping, child abuse, or domestic violence is a 
central example of a presumption implemented for this reason. This Review 
does not advocate abolishing such a presumption. 
 76 See, e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.05 (2014) (creating a presumption in 
the third party custody statute that custody with the biological parent is in the 
child’s best interest unless rebutted); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West 
1995); TEXAS FAM. CODE § 14.01(b)(1) (West 1995). 
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parenting time with each parent, 77  the marital presumption in 
determining parentage of a child,78  the presumption in favor of joint 
custody, 79  and the community property presumption. 80  Presumptions, 
even when rebuttable, allow the judge to rule based on few facts and 
render many facts irrelevant if the presumption cannot be rebutted. For 
example, in a jurisdiction in which a biological parent enjoys a 
presumption in favor of custody with him or her over a third party, a 
judge need only hear facts going to best interest of the child if the 
presumption is overcome.81 
Presumptions and less contextual analyses of best interest of the 
child allow judges to more efficiently manage their dockets.82 Therefore, 
reducing the reliance on presumptions and requiring a more contextual 
analysis could wreak havoc on family law dockets, forcing judges to 
consider each case based not on a baseline presumption, but only on the 
facts presented. To actually consider a case in the contextual way 
Hasday’s critique suggests, judges would need to approach contextual 
                                                                                                             
 77 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(1)(g) (West 2015) (creating a 
rebuttable presumption that a parent is entitled to at least 25% of parenting time 
for a child); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN § 153.252 (West 2013) (creating a 
presumption of “standard possession orders” to determine how to allocate 
parenting time). 
 78 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (West 2014) (establishing 
presumption of paternity); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105 (West 2014); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 (West 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204 
(West 2014). 
 79 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) (West 2014) (creating a 
presumption in favor of joint custody except in circumstances of child abuse, 
parental kidnapping, and domestic violence); FLA. STAT ANN. § 61.13 (c) (West 
2013) (noting that the court “shall order that the parental responsibility for a 
minor child be shared by both parents”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (West 
2013) (implementing a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of 
the child); LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (West 2013) (“the court shall award 
custody to the parents jointly); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West 2006) 
(creating a rebuttable presumption joint custody is in the best interests of the 
child.”). 
 80 See In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 448-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977) (explaining that the community property presumption dictates that 
“property acquired during the marriage become community property”). 
 81 See. e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.05 (2014) (establishing a presumption in 
favor of the biological parent over a third party). 
 82 See generally Michael J. Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme 
Court’s Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Presumption about Human 
Behavior, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593, 612, note 104 (2012) (“Most presumptions 
come into existence because of probability - the proof of one fact renders the 
existence of another so probable that judges save time by assuming the truth of 
the second fact.”); 3-4A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.03 
(“Presumptions normally rest on demonstrated probabilities, and they save 
time and effort in the evidentiary process.”). 
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analyses, such as best interests of the child, with even a heightened 
contextualism. Such an approach would require far more judicial time 
and attention. 
That is where procedural restructuring or support comes in. To 
achieve the level of contextual judicial decision-making that would be 
necessary to begin to achieve Hasday’s vision of post-canon judicial 
decision-making, judges would need support to alleviate the burden of 
their dockets. To do so, courts could implement or increase court-based 
services to utilize non-judicial personnel to work with parties and their 
families to holistically consider the needs of a family, and if possible, 
settle the case prior to an adversary hearing. These services could serve 
to provide more contextual resolutions for parties who can agree to terms 
with assistance and could serve to clear the judicial docket to allow for 
more contextual inquiry into contested family law matters. 
Programs that achieve these two goals could involve volunteer 
support by attorneys who act as negotiators, meeting with parties prior to 
initial hearings and seeking to settle cases by talking to both parties and 
their witnesses. Volunteer attorney-mediators could meet with parties 
separately or together if appropriate and determine if a settlement could 
be reached with little court intervention. Such a program in the District 
of Columbia supports the court several mornings each week and 
substantially lightens the judicial family law docket.83 In Alaska, another 
program involving a magistrate judge and volunteer attorneys and 
mediators has reduced the burden on the family law docket, and resulted 
in settlements that require in very little post-settlement court 
intervention.84 
Formal court-based mediation programs are also critical to 
providing more contextual case resolution and to alleviating judicial 
dockets to permit judge to consider cases in a more thoughtful way. 
Mediation programs are not novel; 85  however, mediation services 
                                                                                                             
 83 See Report of the Family Law Task Force, DC Bar, 5 (2013), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/family-law-task-force-report.pdf (providing a 
brief description of the program); NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/volunteer/vap/program_descriptions.shtml 
(showing an example of a New Jersey program). 
 84 Stacey Marz, Early Resolution for Family Law Cases in Alaska’s Courts, 
Alaska Justice Forum, http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/31/12springsummer 
2014/d_erp.html (last updated Nov. 06, 2014). 
 85 Some states require that parties attempt to resolve custody conflict through 
mediation prior to litigation. See, e.g,. ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (1996); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 3170 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-8 (West 1977); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-56 (2008); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-131 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-39 (West 
2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.4 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202 
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generally have been aimed at divorce cases rather than custody cases, 
which include never-married parents litigating custody and child 
support. 86  Through the mediation, neutral mediators seek to resolve 
disputes without resorting to an adversarial adjudication.87 Prior to trial, 
parties meet privately with a mediator who attempts to craft a settlement 
that satisfies both parties to the extent that they are willing to surrender 
their right to trial.88 The court then enters the settlement reached by the 
parties. Mediation is often successful at reaching resolutions.89 Greatly 
expanding mediation services where appropriate could help achieve 
Hasday’s suggestion of a legal system that addresses the needs of 
families without relying on misplaced assumptions and inaccurate 
doctrines. 
Finally, problem-solving courts could allow the court to employ a 
more contextual response to families.90 Problem-solving courts seek to 
                                                                                                             
(West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.405 (West 2012). See also Nancy Ver 
Steegh et al., Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond: 
Look Before You Leap: Court System Triage of Family Law Cases Involving 
Intimate Partner Violence, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 955, 959 (2012) (discussing 
the prevalence of mandatory mediation as well as mediation at judicial 
discretion). Other states encourage mediation. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-
1402 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1626 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. 
TIT. 19-A, § 1653 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.600 (West 1998). See also 
Child Access and Visitation Programs: Participant Outcomes, DEP’T. OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 5 (2007) [hereinafter Child 
Access] (stating that as of 2001, 46 states offered mediation in family law cases). 
 86 Child Access, supra note 85, at 15. 
 87 See id. at 17-18 (summarizing the success rate of sample mediation 
programs (from 60 – 80% success rate for resolving the dispute)); see also 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-05-02-
00300: Effectiveness of Access and Visitation Grant Programs 1, 7 (2002) 
(asserting that in the four state survey, “[i]n 76% of cases, mediation facilitated 
noncustodial parents’ access rights through the creation of mutually agreed upon 
visitation plans.”). 
 88 See generally Paula Young, A Connecticut Mediator in a Kangaroo 
Court?: Successfully Communicating the “Authorized Practice of Mediation” 
Paradigm to “Unauthorized Practice of Law” Disciplinary Bodies, 49 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 1047, 1161 (2008) (noting that the mediator’s role is to assist the parties 
in reaching a voluntary agreement). 
 89 See Child Access, supra note 58, at 17-18 (summarizing the success rate of 
sample mediation programs (from 60 – 80% success rate for resolving the 
dispute)); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
OEI-05-02-00300: Effectiveness of Access and Visitation Grant Programs 1, 7 
(2002) (asserting that in the four state survey, “[i]n 76% of cases, mediation 
facilitated noncustodial parents’ access rights through the creation of mutually 
agreed upon visitation plans.”). 
 90 See Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and 
Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 553-56 
(2013) (extensively discussing problem-solving courts). 
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apply a collaborative and holistic approach to traditionally adversarial 
cases.91 These courts are distinguishable from traditional courts in that 
they involve team approaches with social services and direct interactions 
between litigants and judges, with judges taking a proactive role in 
solving underlying problems to resolve legal problems.92 Although they 
can require additional resources, problem-solving courts harness the 
expertise and support of professionals to allow the court to more 
contextually address the problem at issue. As such, judges would be able 
to more thoughtfully approach cases on their merits and not rely on 
shortcuts and mistaken assumptions about what family law doctrine 
demands. 
In the end of Family Law Reimagined, the reader is left with a clear 
understanding of the family law canon’s omissions, its 
mischaracterizations, and its implications for marginalized populations. 
But, the reader is also left with hope that the system still can function in a 
way that allows families to resolve disputes, secure rights, and to thrive. 
This book, which forces the reader to constantly question and reassess, 
sets a fertile stage for family law reimagined. 
 
                                                                                                             
 91 See John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York 
Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 282 (2000) (describing the 
collaborative approach utilized by judges, lawyers, and service providers in New 
York’s problem-solving drug courts); Problem-Solving Justice, CENTER FOR 
COURT INNOVATION, http://www. courtinnovation.org/research/problem-
solving-principles?url=research%2F11%2 Farticle&mode=11&type=article 
(examining various shared principles of problem-solving courts, including 
collaborative responses by members of the legal community). 
 92 See generally Donald J. Farole, Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving 
Principles in Mainstream Courts: Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57 
(2005) (providing an overview of the principles behind problem-solving 
courts.); Hon. Milton Lee, Fathering Court: A New Model for Child Support 
Enforcement, 51 JUDGES J. 24, 25 (discussing the philosophy of problem-solving 
courts). 
